Now, gov’t can also have another function which is to have a system where different groups of people can negotiate on commons. (I may take a minute to explain the difference between via-negativa & via-positiva, & briefly define “commons”.) The key is to enable representatives of the people to negotiate on commons without violating reciprocity. The problem is our representatives are currently able to make laws that violate reciprocity (“lawmakers” – they shouldn’t be lawmakers, there is only one law, natural law of reciprocity), instead they should be negotiating on commons, without violating reciprocity. Can you give us an idea how this could look, paint a picture for us? Were there times in our history when we did this better than we do now that would give us a reference point?
Something we’re missing here, is the difference between a perfect institutional model for a given population distribution at a given level of development, and a perfect institutional model for those who have been successful in the production of a middle class polity, where members of the polity own and act as they own the commons as well as the private. So there is an optimum government for europeans, but many other people lag because they cannot at least yet, produce a middle class polity in which every other person is a potential customer in one of the series of markets for cooperation. It’s this incentive not the belief in the good that creates a high trust polity. And it’s rule of law and it’s suppression of parasitism that drives people into those markets instead of markets for parasitism. And by and large it’s a military tradition that makes that law possible. Because military epistemology is empirical and does not tolerate falsehood. Humans do poorly at mixing epistemologies. This is somewhat of a benefit since military epistemology is a prophylactic against sophistry.
The structure is the same but the distribution of the franchise (participation) can only expand as does membership in the market. Furthermore as the market expands, new people enter the market but some others exit it. For example, why do state employees have a vote?
That said there is a conflict between desire for consumption that as it’s increasing produces status feedback, and increases in consumption and change that leave people behind or feeling left behind. So progress only works as long as consumption is increasing. And it’s not any longer because frankly there is very little left we desire to consume at this level of development. We’ve sort of saturated physical, emotional, and intellectual demand. All that’s left is signaling and security.
We had perfect government…(describe british prewar system)
- Methods of Decision Making
- Rule of Law Monarchy with cabinet, and assent and dissent of the public.
- Rule of Law Republic with Representatives
- Rule of Law with Jury selected from the people
- Rule of Law Auction
- Rule of Law Market
- Whether decision is Assent, Dissent, or Contract
- If Assent or Contract
- Equal Vote vs
- Equal Economic Bid, vs
- Proportional Economic Bid.
- Monopoly (and sufficient to fund and reciprocal) or
- Proportionality (sufficient to fund and not irreciprocal.)
- If Assent or Contract
- Houses organized by necessary differences in interests
- Economic Class
- Urban vs Suburban vs Rural (oppy cost differences)
This creates markets for producing trades between groups with different interests.
In a perfect world we would have a government that was dynamic and adapted to periods of war and scarcity (authority), ordinary markets, and windfalls.
A monarchy as a judge of last resort, meaning any decision can be vetoed. And some percentage of revenues under discretionary control of the monarchy so that arts and letters and character are open to exclusive funding.
A federal government limited to function of insurer of last resort, meaning a purely via-negativa government managing military, law, treasury, and social security.
Local governments competing to produce attractive commons
Cities and territories governed separately because of their vast difference in costs and value of commons. Cities are gene sinks they’re terrible but people desire them.